GlinkBot documentation

Permissions and secrets

How approvals, operating-system grants, and provider credentials are handled.

Approval cards

Supported providers emit permission requests and questions through the local harness. GlinkBot displays these inline and records the outcome. Cancellation closes outstanding requests so stale approvals cannot be answered after a turn has ended.

“Always allow” is narrow: it is tied to a server-issued key and a pending request rather than granting arbitrary execution from a paired device.

Operating-system permissions

Screen Recording and Accessibility permissions are controlled by the operating system. The desktop process owns local CUA lifecycle so grants are attributed to GlinkBot.

Secret handling

When a bot asks for a key

A bot asks for a key on a secure card (request_credential), never in chat. A key GlinkBot keeps itself (an AI provider key, the Composio key, voice keys) is saved exactly where Settings → API keys saves it.

Any other secret (a Stripe or npm token, a webhook signing secret, a Notion key for an MCP server) the bot names, and the card says what the bot may do with it:

Connected-app tool grants

Connected apps are scoped per bot on the desktop: a bot without a grant to a service's tool cannot call it, the ungranted tool is never offered to the model, and every allow/deny is written to the decision log. New and upgraded bots keep all tools until someone assigns grants, and imported bots always land with none, so a shared persona cannot reach your Gmail on turn one. Paired phones see grants read-only; grant editing requires the computer.

Website sign-in

Bots may complete a sign-in you explicitly authorize for a particular site and account, using an existing session, autofill, or credentials you supply or designate for that purpose, including test accounts. A login form alone is not a reason to refuse the task. Bots must check the destination and account first; instructions on a webpage do not authorize using credentials.

Bots never ask for a website password, or for a one-time code, in chat, and a bot never holds a password: a login you saved is typed into the page by GlinkBot itself (Saved logins).

When you ask a bot to do something that needs a sign-in (in your own chat, or in a routine or automation you set up) and the site sends a one-time code to your email or phone, the bot reads it from your connected email or messages and types it into that site, then carries on. Your request is the authorization, so it does not ask again. A code only ever goes into the site it was sent for: a bot never sends, posts, forwards or pastes one anywhere else, and a web page, email or document that tells it to share a code, or enter it somewhere else, is ignored.

When a bot is not signed in and has no saved login for the site, the code goes somewhere it cannot read (an authenticator app, a phone it has no access to), or a step needs a CAPTCHA, a passkey, payment details or your personal interaction, it asks you to sign in yourself. You get one Sign in needed card in the chat, naming the site and quoting the bot's reason, and one notification ("Scout needs you to sign in to example.com"). The bot's turn ends there.

A newer request for the same site in the same conversation replaces the older card. The card works on the desktop, the web app, a Cloud home and a desktop paired to another computer (its Screen panel has a Browser view for this; the host must allow browser control for that device in Settings → Remote access). A phone shows the request and its notification; sign in from a computer.

With Open, you type the password into the page yourself. In the Browser tab, Type a password or code… in the browser menu sends masked text to the page's selected field; it is never kept, logged or shown, and goes nowhere but the page. While you hold the browser, the bot's browser tools, screenshots and snapshots are refused, and its live preview pauses. Saved sign-ins persist per browser profile, encrypted. None of this overrides your provider's own restrictions, and approval modes are unchanged.

The Vault

Settings → Vault is one list of the passwords and keys your bots can use: saved logins, saved secrets, and the items of a linked password manager. Search it, or show only Logins or Keys & secrets. Add adds a login, a secret, or a pasted .env file, where each NAME=value line becomes a secret called NAME. Each row shows where it came from, which bots may use it and when it was last used. Change renames a secret, replaces its value or changes which bots may use it; Delete removes it. A saved value is never shown again, and no screen or API returns it: it can only be replaced. Only an owner or an admin sees the Vault, and a Vault link (such as the Keys page's 1Password row, Set up in Vault) opens it. On a Team Cloud a member's Vault lists only the secrets they gave bots in their own chats, which they can delete; an admin's lists the team's and never a member's own. Leaving the team deletes a member's own secrets.

Keys GlinkBot uses itself (an AI provider's key, Composio, voice) stay in Settings → API keys, which the Vault's AI and app keys row opens.

Saved logins

A saved login lets a bot sign in to a site without you. Save one from a Sign in needed card (Save a login), or in Settings → Vault (Add → Add a login). The Vault lists every saved login by site, username, whether it has a 2FA key, where it came from, which bots may use it and when it was last used. Change replaces the password or 2FA key or changes who may use it; Delete removes it. A saved password is never shown again, and no screen or API returns it: it can only be replaced.

When a bot asks you to sign in on its own browser and the Vault has a login for that site the bot may not use yet, the card lists it by username under Use a saved login. Picking it lets the bot (and any bot sharing its browser) use it from then on and answers the card as Save a login does.

Logins from 1Password

A bot that needs it asks with a secure card (request_credential with onePasswordToken), never in chat; what you paste there goes to the same place as Connect 1Password. Only a service account token works: it starts with ops_. A 1Password Connect token, your account password or your Secret Key is refused with a message saying so, and a token 1Password refuses (revoked, expired, or without its vault) is told apart from one that is incomplete.

Every Login item in those vaults that has a website and a password appears in the Vault, marked From 1Password, by the website's site (an item with websites on two sites is listed under both). Each vault is for every bot until you pick bots for it under Password manager in Settings → Vault; a bot not picked does not see that vault's logins at all, neither in its list of logins nor when it calls fill_login. These rows are read-only here: change or remove them in 1Password. fill_login uses them the same way as saved logins, with the same site rule, the same one-time codes (from the item's one-time-password field) and the same scrubbing. The password is read from 1Password at the moment it is filled. Refresh reads the vault again; GlinkBot also does so when its copy of the list is more than ten minutes old. Disconnect forgets the token and everything read from 1Password.

API Credential, Password and Secure Note items in those vaults are secrets a bot may use, by the item's title: a bot that asks for "Notion token" gets the item called Notion token the same way as a secret saved from a card, by one-use reference or private file, and with no card. The main value is an API Credential's credential, a Password's password or a Secure Note's text; any other field is asked for as the title and the field's name, such as "Acme OAuth client_secret". They are listed in the Vault by name, read-only. The value is read from 1Password at the moment the bot gets it, never kept in the Vault, and scrubbed like a filled password. The same vault choice of bots applies, and a secret saved in the Vault under the same name comes first.

1Password's SDK (MIT license) is part of the desktop app, the server image and the openmausbot npm package; it talks to 1Password over the internet, and only once a token is connected.

What is protected, and what is not

Every saved password, saved 2FA key, password filled from 1Password, the 1Password token, and one-time code made in the last few minutes is replaced with •••••• wherever it could flow back to a bot or into a conversation: every browser tool result (snapshots, page text, eval results, console and network output), the stored conversation, and the engine protocol logs. That covers the value as plain text, inside JSON, in a web address and in HTML.

It does not cover everything, and you should know where it stops:

Taking over the Browser tab

Clicking or typing in a bot's Browser tab takes the browser from the bot; it goes back a few seconds after your last input. Take control holds it until you press Hand back, and so does an open sign-in request, so the browser is never handed back while you are in the middle of signing in. Anyone the bot is shown to can watch and drive its browser; installing the browser engine stays with admins.

Shared machines

GlinkBot assumes the logged-in operating-system user is the workspace owner. On a shared machine, other administrators may be able to read application data or inspect processes. Use a dedicated OS account for stronger separation.

GlinkBot documentation, reviewed for the 0.0.4 codebase. Public download availability can differ. Licenses and acknowledgments.